External risk intelligence

Kamailio ims_registrar_pcscf Stack Overflow Denial of Service.

CVE advisorySeverity: CRITICAL (CVSS 9.8)

CVE-2026-106803

Kamailio is a SIP server, and the P-CSCF (Proxy-Call Session Control Function) is a core network element in IMS architectures designed to process SIP signaling traffic. As an edge component that handles incoming external SIP traffic, it is typically exposed to the public internet or peering networks by design to facilitate communication.

Buffer Overflow

Halo Surface Signal: 5 out of 5 — more likely to be public-facing.

External exposure likelihood

Horizon Alert

Summary of the vulnerability and why it matters

A critical vulnerability has been identified in the ims_registrar_pcscf module of Kamailio, a technology used for handling signaling traffic in certain telecommunications networks. This flaw allows unauthenticated remote attackers to disrupt the system, potentially leading to a denial of service. The primary concern is to confirm whether your environment utilizes this specific module and is therefore exposed.

  • Vulnerability could disrupt signaling services.
  • Affects core network functions.
  • Confirm exposure and relevance.

Attack Path

How an attacker could exploit the issue

An unauthenticated attacker could target the ims_registrar_pcscf module in Kamailio. By sending a specially crafted NOTIFY message, the attacker can exploit a buffer overflow in the process_contact function, which copies port data without proper length validation. This can lead to the termination of the P-CSCF process.

  • Remote, unauthenticated access required.
  • Crafted NOTIFY message triggers overflow.
  • Denial of service via process termination.

Live Threat

Current exploitation, exposure, and threat context

A stack-based buffer overflow in the `ims_registrar_pcscf` module could allow an unauthenticated remote attacker to corrupt the stack by sending a crafted `application/reginfo+xml` NOTIFY message. This could lead to the termination of the P-CSCF process, causing a denial of service.

  • P-CSCF process termination.
  • Crafted NOTIFY message processing.
  • Denial of service for SIP services.

Operational Fix

Recommended remediation, mitigation, and detection steps

The ims_registrar_pcscf module in Kamailio is likely managed by the platform team or telephony infrastructure team responsible for SIP services. The immediate first step is to identify all instances of this module, confirm their exposure to untrusted networks, and determine their business criticality. Once these are understood, the accountable owner can be engaged to plan remediation, potentially involving vendor coordination or temporary risk reduction measures if immediate patching is not feasible.

  • Platform or infrastructure teams own this.
  • Verify external reachability and criticality.
  • Plan risk-based remediation actions.

Supplementary metadata

Validate whether this threat affects your internet-facing exposure.

Halo Threat Intelligence helps prioritize remediation with Halo Surface Signal and H/A/L/O context. Start exposure validation with a free external attack surface trial.

Frequently asked questions

What is Kamailio and the ims_registrar_pcscf module?

Kamailio is an open-source SIP server used to manage real-time communication traffic. The ims_registrar_pcscf module is a specific component that functions as a Proxy-Call Session Control Function within IMS architectures. It acts as the initial point of contact for endpoints, handling SIP signaling messages to manage user registrations and session setups in telecommunications networks.

What is the vulnerability in CVE-2026-106803?

This vulnerability is a stack-based buffer overflow, identified as CWE-121. It occurs because the software fails to check the length of a port value provided in a message before copying it into a fixed, small-sized memory area on the stack. This memory error allows a specially crafted message to overwrite adjacent stack data, causing the P-CSCF process to crash.

How is this stack overflow triggered?

An attacker triggers this by sending a crafted application/reginfo+xml NOTIFY message to the P-CSCF. The vulnerability specifically lies in how the process_contact function handles the port value within an alias parameter. The bug is not triggered by standard, well-formed SIP traffic; it requires an attacker to intentionally provide an overly long port value that exceeds the 5-byte buffer limit.

Is my system at risk according to Halo Surface Signal?

Halo Surface Signal indicates that because the P-CSCF is an edge component designed to process incoming signaling traffic, it is very likely to be exposed to the public internet or external peering networks. If your Kamailio instance is configured to accept SIP traffic from these untrusted networks, it is in a position where an unauthenticated remote attacker could potentially reach and exploit this module.

What should I do if I run Kamailio?

Begin by working with your telephony infrastructure team to locate all instances of the ims_registrar_pcscf module within your environment. Once identified, assess whether these instances are reachable from untrusted networks and evaluate their business importance. Use this information to coordinate with the appropriate teams to plan for updates or implement temporary controls to reduce the risk of service disruption.

References