External risk intelligence

OpenEJB HTTP Server Authentication Bypass Allows Protected EJB Method Invocation

CVE advisorySeverity: CRITICAL (CVSS 9.8)

CVE-2026-111245

The vulnerability resides in the OpenEJB HTTP server, which is commonly used to expose web services and APIs. As an HTTP-based service handling web requests, it is frequently deployed as an internet-facing component or an edge service to facilitate remote communication, making it a likely target for public network exposure.

Halo Surface Signal: 4 out of 5 — likely to be public-facing.

External exposure likelihood

Horizon Alert

Summary of the vulnerability and why it matters

This advisory highlights a critical security flaw in how web services are handled by the standalone OpenEJB HTTP server. When a user successfully authenticates, their identity can inadvertently remain linked to the server's processing threads. This means a subsequent, unauthenticated request processed on the same thread could potentially execute sensitive actions using the previous user's credentials, allowing unauthorized access to protected functions.

  • Stolen user identities grant unauthorized access.
  • Confirms potential for serious unauthorized actions.
  • Verify exposure, understand potential unauthorized access.

Attack Path

How an attacker could exploit the issue

An attacker can exploit this by first gaining access to the server, which is exposed to the network. After authenticating using WS-Security, the attacker can then trick a subsequent request processed on the same server thread into invoking protected methods with the identity of the prior authenticated user. This could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive data or actions.

  • Network access required.
  • Authenticate, then reuse thread identity.
  • Unauthorized access to protected methods.

Live Threat

Current exploitation, exposure, and threat context

A security flaw in the OpenEJB HTTP server could allow an unauthenticated attacker to impersonate a previously authenticated user. This occurs when a worker thread, after processing a legitimate user's request, retains that user's identity. If another request is later processed on the same thread, the attacker could potentially invoke protected methods using the prior user's credentials, when supported by the advisory.

  • Protected EJB methods could be invoked.
  • Attackers may impersonate authenticated users.
  • Unauthorized access to sensitive functions.

Operational Fix

Recommended remediation, mitigation, and detection steps

This vulnerability affects the OpenEJB HTTP server component used for serving web services. The primary responsibility for addressing this likely lies with teams managing application infrastructure and platform services that utilize OpenEJB. The first practical step is to identify all instances of this technology, determine their exposure and criticality, and locate the accountable owner before planning remediation.

  • Platform and application infrastructure teams own.
  • Verify OpenEJB deployment exposure and criticality.
  • Plan remediation, coordinate with vendors.

Supplementary metadata

Validate whether this threat affects your internet-facing exposure.

Halo Threat Intelligence helps prioritize remediation with Halo Surface Signal and H/A/L/O context. Start exposure validation with a free external attack surface trial.

Frequently asked questions

What is the OpenEJB HTTP server and why is it used?

OpenEJB is a lightweight, open-source EJB container that provides services for Java enterprise applications. Its standalone HTTP server component allows developers to expose web services and remote APIs directly, facilitating communication between distributed systems and clients without requiring a full Java EE application server.

What does CWE-488 mean for CVE-2026-111245?

CWE-488 refers to exposure of a data or resource to an unintended control sphere, often involving shared resources. In this vulnerability, it describes how a worker thread fails to clear a user's identity after a task finishes. Because the identity persists, the server mistakenly associates a subsequent, unauthenticated request with the previous, authenticated user's credentials.

How does an attacker trigger this authentication bypass?

An attacker exploits this by relying on the server's thread-pooling mechanism. The vulnerability requires the server to process a legitimate user request using WS-Security, followed by an attacker's request on that same reused thread. It does not trigger if the thread is properly cleaned or reset between requests, or if the server does not support WS-Security UsernameToken authentication.

Is my system at risk according to Halo Surface Signal?

Halo Surface Signal identifies this as a likely risk because the OpenEJB HTTP server is often deployed as an edge service or internet-facing component. If your instance is reachable from a public network, it faces a higher probability of being targeted for unauthorized access to protected EJB methods compared to services restricted to internal, private networks.

What should I do if I am running OpenEJB?

First, locate all servers using the OpenEJB HTTP component to assess your infrastructure footprint. Verify if these instances are internet-facing to determine their priority. Once identified, plan an upgrade to version 10.3.0 or 11.0.0-M2, as these releases contain the necessary code changes to clear identity information correctly after request completion.

References