External risk intelligence

Nexus Repository SAML OAuth2 OpenID Connect Authentication Bypass Enables Re-authentication with Disabled Accounts.

CVE advisorySeverity: CRITICAL (CVSS 9.1)

CVE-2026-113373

Sonatype Nexus Repository is commonly deployed as an internet-facing or externally accessible application to facilitate artifact management and development workflows. The vulnerability involves the authentication flow via SAML or OAuth2/OIDC, which are standard mechanisms for remote access and identity management in exposed web-based services.

Halo Surface Signal: 4 out of 5 — likely to be public-facing.

External exposure likelihood

Horizon Alert

Summary of the vulnerability and why it matters

This advisory concerns a vulnerability in Sonatype Nexus Repository 3 Pro, where disabled or locked user accounts can still log in using valid external identity provider credentials. This bypasses local account management, potentially allowing unauthorized access with previously held permissions. The main concern is confirming relevance and exposure, as the exploit requires specific external account configurations.

  • Disabled accounts can still log in.
  • Bypasses local access controls.
  • Confirm if this affects your organization.

Attack Path

How an attacker could exploit the issue

An attacker could gain unauthorized access to a Sonatype Nexus Repository 3 Pro instance by leveraging a misconfiguration in its handling of external identity providers. If an administrator has disabled or locked a user's account within Nexus, but that user still possesses valid credentials for the connected SAML or OAuth2/OpenID Connect identity provider, the attacker can use those credentials to log in. This bypasses the local account status check, granting the attacker a new session with the privileges associated with the compromised account.

  • Attacker needs valid identity provider credentials.
  • Triggered when an account is disabled but active in the provider.
  • Risk of unauthorized access to account privileges.

Live Threat

Current exploitation, exposure, and threat context

When supported by the advisory, an attacker with valid identity provider credentials for a named account could bypass local account status checks in Sonatype Nexus Repository 3 Pro. This could allow a disabled or locked account to regain access and assume its previous roles, potentially affecting service behavior.

  • Affected asset: Named accounts with valid credentials.
  • Exposure: Bypassing local account status checks.
  • Consequence: Reinstatement of account roles and access.

Operational Fix

Recommended remediation, mitigation, and detection steps

The Sonatype Nexus Repository owner, likely a platform or infrastructure team, must first confirm the presence and reachability of the affected Nexus Repository instances. The initial step involves identifying all deployed instances, assessing their exposure, and confirming their business criticality to prioritize remediation efforts with the appropriate application or security teams.

  • Platform or infrastructure team owns the issue.
  • Verify instance reachability and business criticality.
  • Plan remediation based on identified risk.

Supplementary metadata

Validate whether this threat affects your internet-facing exposure.

Halo Threat Intelligence helps prioritize remediation with Halo Surface Signal and H/A/L/O context. Start exposure validation with a free external attack surface trial.

Frequently asked questions

What is Sonatype Nexus Repository 3 Pro?

It is a central platform used by development and infrastructure teams to manage, store, and distribute software components and build artifacts. It acts as a critical hub in the software supply chain, supporting diverse package formats and integrating with enterprise authentication systems like SAML and OAuth2/OIDC to control access to these proprietary assets.

How does CVE-2026-113373 function?

This vulnerability involves an Improper Authorization (CWE-1390) weakness. When a user authenticates via an external identity provider, the application fails to verify the local account status within its own internal database. If an administrator has explicitly disabled or locked a user account to stop access, the application incorrectly grants a new, valid session instead of denying entry, effectively ignoring the local restriction.

What does an attacker need to trigger this?

An attacker must possess valid credentials for an external identity provider account, such as a corporate SSO account. The target account must already exist within Nexus Repository with specific roles assigned. Importantly, this bypass does not involve the anonymous user account; the attacker must be attempting to sign in as a specific, named user whose account was previously disabled by a system administrator.

Is my instance at risk?

According to Halo Surface Signal, this software is commonly deployed in internet-facing configurations to support remote developer workflows, which increases the likelihood of external accessibility. If your Nexus Repository instance uses SAML, OAuth2, or OpenID Connect for user authentication and is reachable via the internet, it is a primary candidate for review regarding this authentication bypass.

What are the first steps to take?

Begin by inventorying all deployed Nexus Repository instances to determine which ones utilize external identity providers. Once mapped, assess the accessibility of these instances to see if they are exposed to the broader network or internet. Coordinate with your platform or infrastructure team to confirm your version status and prioritize these findings based on the business criticality of the artifacts being managed.

References