External risk intelligence

Networknt light-4j Authentication Bypass via Empty LDAP Password

CVE advisorySeverity: CRITICAL (CVSS 9.1)

CVE-2026-113682

The vulnerability exists in light-4j, a Java framework frequently used to build microservices and API gateways. Authentication handlers in such frameworks are typically deployed at the edge of services to manage ingress traffic, making them commonly reachable in network-exposed API or web service deployments.

Authentication Bypass

Halo Surface Signal: 4 out of 5 — likely to be public-facing.

External exposure likelihood

Horizon Alert

Summary of the vulnerability and why it matters

A vulnerability in the light-4j framework could allow unauthorized access to systems by bypassing authentication. This issue arises when specific credentials, namely a known username with an empty password, are used, potentially enabling attackers to bind to LDAP or Active Directory services as legitimate users. The primary concern is to determine if this technology is in use and, if so, to assess the exposure.

  • Bypass authentication for unauthorized access.
  • Leadership should remember the bypassed authentication risk.
  • Confirm if this technology is in use.

Attack Path

How an attacker could exploit the issue

An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending a specially crafted Basic Authorization header over the network to a vulnerable service. This header would contain a known username but an empty password, bypassing the authentication mechanism. The system would then perform an unauthenticated LDAP bind, which is accepted as successful authentication, granting the attacker access as a delegated user.

  • Unauthenticated network access required.
  • Triggered by a crafted authorization header.
  • Allows unauthenticated login as delegated users.

Live Threat

Current exploitation, exposure, and threat context

This vulnerability could allow unauthenticated attackers to bypass authentication mechanisms in systems using affected versions of networknt light-4j. When a Basic Authorization header is sent with a known username and an empty password, the system may perform an unauthenticated LDAP bind that is accepted as successful. This could impact services that rely on this handler for user authentication.

  • User credentials could be exposed.
  • Attackers could bypass authentication.
  • Unauthorized access to services.

Operational Fix

Recommended remediation, mitigation, and detection steps

The network/security teams and platform/application owners are most likely responsible for addressing this authentication bypass vulnerability in light-4j. The first practical step involves identifying all deployments of the affected technology, confirming their network reachability and business criticality, and then engaging the accountable owners to plan remediation.

  • Identify affected technology deployments.
  • Verify network exposure and criticality.
  • Plan remediation with accountable owners.

Supplementary metadata

Validate whether this threat affects your internet-facing exposure.

Halo Threat Intelligence helps prioritize remediation with Halo Surface Signal and H/A/L/O context. Start exposure validation with a free external attack surface trial.

Frequently asked questions

What is Networknt light-4j?

Networknt light-4j is a lightweight, high-performance Java framework designed for building cloud-native microservices and API gateways. It provides developers with essential tools to manage ingress traffic, handle security, and route requests efficiently across distributed system architectures.

What does CVE-2026-113682 mean for system security?

This CVE represents an authentication bypass, classified under CWE-287 (Improper Authentication). It means the software's mechanism for verifying identities fails under specific conditions, allowing an attacker to gain access as a legitimate user without providing a valid password.

How can an attacker trigger this vulnerability?

An attacker triggers the flaw by sending a network request with a specifically crafted Basic Authorization header containing a valid username but an empty password. It does not trigger if the system is not configured to use LDAP or Active Directory for delegated authentication.

Is my service at risk if it uses light-4j?

Halo Surface Signal indicates that because light-4j is commonly deployed at the edge of services to manage ingress traffic, it is frequently reachable via the internet. If your microservices or API gateways are network-exposed, they are more likely to be reachable by an unauthorized actor attempting this bypass.

How should I respond to this threat?

First, inventory your software ecosystem to identify all instances where light-4j versions 2.1.5 through 2.3.x are running. Once located, verify if these services use the affected BasicAuthHandler with LDAP integration, then prioritize upgrading those environments to version 2.4.0 or later.

References