External risk intelligence

Assent Sign in with Apple Impersonation Vulnerability

CVE advisorySeverity: CRITICAL (CVSS 9.3)

CVE-2026-117656

The vulnerability exists in an authentication strategy specifically designed for Sign in with Apple. This functionality is intended for public-facing web and mobile applications that utilize external identity providers for user authentication, making the affected callback endpoint inherently internet-accessible by design in all normal deployments.

Halo Surface Signal: 5 out of 5 — more likely to be public-facing.

External exposure likelihood

Horizon Alert

Summary of the vulnerability and why it matters

This vulnerability in an authentication component allows an unauthenticated attacker to impersonate users during the "Sign in with Apple" process. By manipulating data submitted during the callback, an attacker could potentially gain unauthorized access or influence application actions based on their altered identity. The primary concern is to confirm if this specific authentication method is in use and if the affected component is exposed.

  • Attackers can impersonate users during sign-in.
  • Key authentication process is vulnerable to manipulation.
  • Confirm usage and exposure of "Sign in with Apple."

Attack Path

How an attacker could exploit the issue

An unauthenticated attacker can impersonate users by manipulating data during the "Sign in with Apple" process. The attacker initiates a login with their own Apple ID and then modifies the user information sent back to the application. If the application relies on this data to identify or authorize users, it will mistakenly grant the attacker access as the legitimate user, leading to account takeover.

  • No prior access is needed.
  • Modifying callback data triggers vulnerability.
  • Can lead to account impersonation.

Live Threat

Current exploitation, exposure, and threat context

When supported by the advisory, an unauthenticated remote attacker could impersonate another user by manipulating the 'user' parameter during an authorization callback for the Sign in with Apple strategy. This manipulation could lead to the attacker's claimed identity being accepted over verified user data, potentially affecting applications that link or authorize accounts based on the subject or email information provided.

  • User accounts and associated data.
  • Attacker manipulates callback data.
  • Unauthorized access to user information.

Operational Fix

Recommended remediation, mitigation, and detection steps

This vulnerability impacts applications using the "Sign in with Apple" strategy, specifically within the `pow-auth Assent` component. The primary responsibility for addressing this issue likely falls on the application owners or platform teams who integrate and manage this authentication flow. The initial, critical step is to identify all instances of `pow-auth Assent`, confirm their reachability and business criticality, and then assign ownership for remediation.

  • Application or platform teams own remediation.
  • Verify affected `pow-auth Assent` integration points.
  • Plan updates during the next maintenance window.

Supplementary metadata

Validate whether this threat affects your internet-facing exposure.

Halo Threat Intelligence helps prioritize remediation with Halo Surface Signal and H/A/L/O context. Start exposure validation with a free external attack surface trial.

Frequently asked questions

What is pow-auth Assent?

Assent is a library used within Elixir applications to facilitate integration with various external identity providers. It simplifies the process of adding third-party login features, such as "Sign in with Apple," allowing developers to handle complex OAuth and OpenID Connect flows without writing the underlying authentication logic from scratch.

What does Acceptance of Extraneous Untrusted Data mean for CVE-2026-117656?

This vulnerability, classified as CWE-290 and CWE-349, occurs when a system incorrectly trusts user-supplied data over cryptographically verified information. In this case, the application receives a secure token from Apple but then overwrites that verified data with unverified, attacker-controlled input provided during the callback process. By tricking the application into accepting this fake identity information, an attacker can effectively impersonate any user.

How is this impersonation triggered?

An attacker initiates a standard "Sign in with Apple" flow using their own valid Apple account. During the callback phase, the attacker intercepts or manually modifies the user parameter before it reaches the server. If the application logic relies on this easily manipulated parameter to identify the user—rather than strictly using the verified ID token—the malicious data is merged into the application session, successfully bypassing identity checks.

Is my application at risk?

According to Halo Surface Signal, this vulnerability is very likely to impact your environment if you utilize the "Sign in with Apple" strategy provided by Assent. Because this authentication functionality is designed to facilitate external logins, the affected callback endpoints are typically internet-facing by design. If your service uses these specific Assent components to link or authorize user accounts, it is potentially exposed to remote impersonation.

What should I do to secure my application?

First, conduct an audit to confirm if your codebase uses the affected versions of the Assent library, specifically those from 0.1.25 before 0.3.2. Once identified, prioritize updating to a patched version provided by the maintainers. As an immediate precaution, ensure your authentication logic strictly validates data against the original, signed ID token returned by Apple and ignores any supplemental, unverified form parameters provided during the callback.

References