External risk intelligence

Eclipse Mosquitto PROXY Protocol v2 SSL Information Bypass.

CVE advisorySeverity: CRITICAL (CVSS 9.1)

CVE-2026-129705

Eclipse Mosquitto is a widely deployed message broker often used as a network-facing edge service or gateway for IoT and telemetry data. While the vulnerability requires a specific PROXY protocol configuration, such brokers are frequently exposed to the internet to facilitate communication with distributed clients, making the vulnerable listener surface commonly reachable in real-world deployment scenarios.

Halo Surface Signal: 4 out of 5 — likely to be public-facing.

External exposure likelihood

Horizon Alert

Summary of the vulnerability and why it matters

A vulnerability has been identified in Eclipse Mosquitto, a widely used message broker. When configured with specific proxy protocol settings, an untrusted proxy could provide false information, potentially allowing the broker to accept fake security credentials. The primary concern is confirming whether your environment uses this specific configuration and is exposed to untrusted proxies.

  • Fake proxy details can trick the broker.
  • Impacts systems using specific proxy settings.
  • Verify configuration and proxy trust.

Attack Path

How an attacker could exploit the issue

An attacker could exploit this by sending specially crafted details through an untrusted proxy to a Mosquitto broker configured with a PROXY protocol listener. This allows the broker to accept fake SSL information, potentially leading to unauthenticated access or other security issues.

  • Requires an untrusted proxy.
  • Triggered by fake SSL information.
  • Risk: Broker accepts fake SSL.

Live Threat

Current exploitation, exposure, and threat context

When a broker is configured with a listener that uses the PROXY protocol v2, an untrusted proxy could provide details that enable the broker to accept fake SSL information. This vulnerability could affect the integrity of the broker's listener when these specific conditions are met.

  • Broker listener data.
  • Untrusted proxy provides fake SSL info.
  • Broker accepts fake SSL information.

Operational Fix

Recommended remediation, mitigation, and detection steps

The presence of this vulnerability likely falls under the purview of teams managing the Eclipse Mosquitto message broker, which could include platform, infrastructure, or IoT/edge teams. The immediate priority is to inventory all Mosquitto instances, identify those with PROXY protocol listeners configured, and assess their exposure and criticality. Once identified, the accountable owner should be engaged to plan remediation, prioritizing instances that are internet-reachable or handle sensitive data.

  • Identify Mosquitto instances with PROXY protocol.
  • Verify listener reachability and business criticality.
  • Plan remediation based on confirmed risk.

Supplementary metadata

Validate whether this threat affects your internet-facing exposure.

Halo Threat Intelligence helps prioritize remediation with Halo Surface Signal and H/A/L/O context. Start exposure validation with a free external attack surface trial.

Frequently asked questions

What is Eclipse Mosquitto?

Eclipse Mosquitto is an open-source message broker that implements the MQTT protocol. It acts as a central hub for devices to exchange data, commonly serving as a lightweight gateway for IoT telemetry, sensor networks, and real-time messaging systems. Because it is highly efficient, it is frequently deployed at the edge of networks to bridge communication between distributed clients and backend infrastructure.

What does CWE-290 mean for CVE-2026-129705?

This vulnerability involves 'Authentication Bypass by Spoofing' (CWE-290). In this context, it means the software incorrectly trusts information provided by an external source. Because the broker fails to properly verify the identity claims sent via the PROXY protocol v2, it can be tricked into accepting forged SSL credentials as if they were legitimate, potentially undermining the security of the entire connection.

How is this vulnerability triggered?

The issue is triggered when an untrusted third party connects to a Mosquitto listener that has been enabled to use PROXY protocol v2. If the listener is misconfigured to allow direct client connections instead of only accepting traffic from a known, trusted proxy, an attacker can supply malicious data. Normal traffic or connections on standard MQTT listeners that do not use the PROXY protocol configuration are not affected by this specific flaw.

Why is this a risk for internet-facing brokers?

According to Halo Surface Signal, Eclipse Mosquitto is often used as a network-facing edge service. When these brokers are exposed to the internet, they are reachable by any external actor. If such an instance uses the vulnerable PROXY protocol configuration, an attacker can attempt to spoof SSL information remotely. This makes internet-reachable brokers significantly higher risk than those isolated within a private, internal network.

What should I do if I run Eclipse Mosquitto?

Start by auditing your configuration files to see if any listeners are configured to use the PROXY protocol v2. If you find these listeners, ensure that they are strictly configured to accept connections only from trusted proxy sources. Verify that no direct client traffic is allowed to reach those specific listeners. If you cannot guarantee the trustworthiness of the proxy source, disable the PROXY protocol feature on that listener until you can implement stricter network controls.

References