Horizon Alert
Summary of the vulnerability and why it matters
A critical vulnerability has been identified in Metacat data repository software, specifically within its REST API endpoints. This unauthenticated SQL injection flaw allows for the potential exfiltration, alteration, or deletion of sensitive data, including management information, access logs, and user identification details.
- Unauthenticated attackers can exploit Metacat APIs to steal or change data.
- Protects sensitive research data and user information from compromise.
- Confirm Metacat usage and exposure to potential data compromise.
Attack Path
How an attacker could exploit the issue
An attacker can target Metacat's REST API endpoints without needing any authentication. By sending specially crafted requests with malicious SQL commands in the `nodeId` parameter, an attacker can trick the application into executing arbitrary SQL queries. Metacat then reflects the database's error messages, which include the results of the injected SQL, directly back to the attacker, allowing them to steal, alter, or delete sensitive data.
- Unauthenticated network access required.
- Malicious input to API endpoints.
- Data exfiltration, modification, or deletion.
Live Threat
Current exploitation, exposure, and threat context
The Metacat data repository software has an unauthenticated SQL injection vulnerability in its REST API endpoints, allowing attackers to execute arbitrary SQL commands. This could lead to the extraction, modification, or deletion of all data stored within the Metacat database, including sensitive management, access, and identifying information.
- Sensitive data and system integrity.
- Via unsanitized user input in API calls.
- Full database compromise.
Operational Fix
Recommended remediation, mitigation, and detection steps
Data repository software like Metacat, used for preserving, sharing, and discovering data, can be a critical component for research institutions. In this case, the vulnerability lies within unauthenticated REST API endpoints, suggesting that infrastructure and security teams are likely involved in managing access and exposure. The first practical step is to identify all Metacat instances, confirm their network reachability and business criticality, and then locate the accountable owner for remediation.
- Identify Metacat data repository owners.
- Verify `/cn/v1/object` and `/cn/v2/object` endpoint exposure.
- Disable endpoints or plan upgrade to version 3.4.1.