Horizon Alert
Summary of the vulnerability and why it matters
A security vulnerability has been identified in self-hosted Typebot versions up to 3.17.1, affecting its default email magic-link authentication. This flaw allows an unauthenticated attacker, knowing a user's email address, to potentially gain account takeover by brute-forcing a verification code. Deployments using only OAuth or SSO are not impacted.
- Issue: Login codes can be guessed to take over accounts.
- Why remember: It impacts user access to chatbot data.
- Executive takeaway: Confirm relevance and review authentication methods.
Attack Path
How an attacker could exploit the issue
An attacker can target self-hosted Typebot instances that use email-based login. By repeatedly guessing a short, time-limited login code sent to a victim's email address, an attacker can bypass authentication and gain full control of the victim's account and its associated data. This attack is possible because the system lacks sufficient protections against brute-force attempts on the login code and uses a predictable code generation method.
- Anonymous attacker can reach login endpoint.
- Brute-force short, time-limited login code.
- Leads to account takeover and data access.
Live Threat
Current exploitation, exposure, and threat context
In self-hosted Typebot instances using default email magic-link authentication, an anonymous attacker could potentially gain unauthorized access to a user's account. This could occur by repeatedly guessing a short, time-limited verification code sent via email, leading to account takeover. Deployments using only OAuth or SSO, without email-based authentication, are not affected.
- User accounts and their associated bots.
- Brute-forcing a 6-digit code.
- Unauthorized access to bot data.
Operational Fix
Recommended remediation, mitigation, and detection steps
For self-hosted Typebot instances using passwordless email magic-link authentication, application owners or platform teams are likely responsible for remediation. The initial step is to identify all deployments, confirm their accessibility and criticality, and then plan remediation based on risk. Deployments using only OAuth or SSO are not affected.
- Application owners must own the issue.
- Verify email magic-link authentication configurations.
- Plan remediation for affected deployments.