External risk intelligence

NASA ANMS and DTNMA REST API Unauthenticated Command Execution

CVE advisorySeverity: CRITICAL (CVSS 9.8)

CVE-2026-71289

The default deployment configuration explicitly publishes the REST API to the host network interface. As a network management system intended for ground node communication, this service is designed to be accessible across a network, making it likely to be reachable in environments where this management interface is exposed to a broader network segment.

Missing Authentication

Halo Surface Signal: 4 out of 5 — likely to be public-facing.

External exposure likelihood

Horizon Alert

Summary of the vulnerability and why it matters

A vulnerability has been identified in the reference implementation of NASA's Asynchronous Network Management System, specifically impacting how its management service is exposed. This oversight allows unauthenticated access to control connected agents, potentially enabling unauthorized command execution and data manipulation within the network management infrastructure. The main concern is confirming relevance and exposure.

  • Unsecured management API allows unauthorized control.
  • Critical for understanding potential network access.
  • Verify if this system is deployed and exposed.

Attack Path

How an attacker could exploit the issue

An attacker can reach the vulnerable component by exploiting the default configuration of the NASA-AMMOS ANMS, which exposes its management service directly to the host network. This bypasses the intended authentication gateway, allowing any network-connected client to interact with the system. The vulnerability enables an attacker to send commands to managed devices and clear reports without any authentication, potentially leading to significant disruption or data manipulation.

  • Unauthenticated network access required.
  • Triggered by sending commands to agents.
  • Risk of unauthorized control and data manipulation.

Live Threat

Current exploitation, exposure, and threat context

When the NASA-AMMOS Asynchronous Network Management System's reference implementation is deployed with its default configurations, its management service can be accessed without authentication. This allows any network-reachable client to interact with DTNMA agents, which can represent simulated or real spacecraft and ground nodes. This could potentially enable attackers to send unauthorized commands to these agents, clear stored reports, and gain insight into the system's operations.

  • DTNMA agents and their command dispatch.
  • Unauthenticated access to management API.
  • Unauthorized commands and report deletion.

Operational Fix

Recommended remediation, mitigation, and detection steps

System owners and infrastructure teams are likely responsible for addressing this vulnerability. The first practical step is to identify all instances of the affected NASA-AMMOS ANMS and JHUAPL-DTNMA tools within the environment, determine their network reachability and criticality, and then assign an owner for remediation planning.

  • Identify affected systems and owners.
  • Verify network exposure and criticality.
  • Plan remediation based on risk.

Supplementary metadata

Validate whether this threat affects your internet-facing exposure.

Halo Threat Intelligence helps prioritize remediation with Halo Surface Signal and H/A/L/O context. Start exposure validation with a free external attack surface trial.

Frequently asked questions

What is the NASA-AMMOS Asynchronous Network Management System?

ANMS is a reference implementation used for managing Disruption Tolerant Networking (DTN) environments. It acts as a ground-based control hub, communicating with DTNMA agents—which can be simulated or real ground and space-based nodes—to send commands, manage configurations, and collect reports across complex or intermittent network paths.

Why is CVE-2026-71289 considered a missing authentication issue?

This vulnerability falls under CWE-306, which refers to a lack of authentication for critical functions. In this software, the default configuration bypasses the intended Configuration and Access Manager (CAM) gateway. Because the REST API is set to accept commands with a null authentication callback, the system fails to verify the identity of anyone sending requests.

How does an attacker trigger this vulnerability?

An attacker interacts directly with the exposed management service over the network. They do not need to exploit a complex software bug; simply sending an EXECSET-encoded command set to the agent-dispatch endpoints allows them to execute commands or clear reports. Requests sent through authorized, secure channels that correctly implement the CAM gateway would not trigger this specific flaw.

Is my system at risk?

According to Halo Surface Signal, risk is likely if the management service is reachable on your network. Because the default configuration exposes the REST API directly to the host network interface, any instance of this software that is not behind a firewall or restricted network segment may be accessible to unauthorized clients.

What should I do if I use this software?

Start by identifying all deployments of NASA-AMMOS and JHUAPL-DTNMA tools within your environment. Once mapped, confirm their network reachability to determine which instances are exposed to untrusted segments. Finally, designate an owner for each system to plan security hardening, focusing on restoring the required authentication gateway.

References