External risk intelligence

passport-saml-encrypted XML Signature Wrapping Vulnerability

CVE advisorySeverity: CRITICAL (CVSS 9.1)

CVE-2026-89043

This vulnerability exists in a SAML authentication library. SAML is a standard protocol for identity federation and SSO, typically implemented on internet-facing identity portals, service providers, and web applications that must remain reachable to accept authentication assertions from external users or identity providers.

Halo Surface Signal: 5 out of 5 — more likely to be public-facing.

External exposure likelihood

Horizon Alert

Summary of the vulnerability and why it matters

This advisory highlights a critical vulnerability in a SAML authentication library that could allow an attacker to impersonate a verified identity by manipulating security assertions. The issue stems from independent validation processes that do not cross-check signature and assertion details.

  • A security flaw could let imposters bypass identity checks.
  • It affects systems handling secure user logins.
  • Confirm relevance and exposure to manage risks.

Attack Path

How an attacker could exploit the issue

An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending a specially crafted SAML message to a service that uses the affected library for authentication. Because the library independently verifies the signature and extracts the assertion without cross-validation, an attacker can prepend a forged, unsigned assertion to a validly signed SAML message. This allows the attacker's forged assertion to be accepted as the user's identity, effectively bypassing authentication.

  • Requires any validly signed SAML message.
  • Prepending forged assertion bypasses verification.
  • Risk of unauthorized access or identity compromise.

Live Threat

Current exploitation, exposure, and threat context

A signature verification flaw in passport-saml-encrypted could allow an attacker to present a forged, unsigned assertion as a valid identity while the original signature is still validated. This could occur when an application relies on this library to process SAML messages, potentially impacting systems that use it for authentication.

  • Forged assertions could be accepted.
  • Attackers prepend unsigned assertions.
  • Identity can be impersonated.

Operational Fix

Recommended remediation, mitigation, and detection steps

This vulnerability resides in the `passport-saml-encrypted` library, a component used for SAML authentication. Ownership likely falls to the platform or application teams responsible for identity and access management, particularly those managing internet-facing authentication services or Single Sign-On (SSO) integrations. The initial practical step is to identify all deployments of this library, assess their exposure and criticality, and then coordinate remediation with the accountable owner, potentially involving vendor collaboration for updates.

  • Platform/application teams own remediation.
  • Verify SAML implementations and exposure.
  • Plan updates or vendor coordination.

Supplementary metadata

Validate whether this threat affects your internet-facing exposure.

Halo Threat Intelligence helps prioritize remediation with Halo Surface Signal and H/A/L/O context. Start exposure validation with a free external attack surface trial.

Frequently asked questions

What is passport-saml-encrypted used for?

This software is a Node.js library used to handle SAML (Security Assertion Markup Language) assertions. Developers integrate it into web applications to enable Single Sign-On (SSO) and identity federation, allowing users to log in through a centralized identity provider rather than managing separate credentials for every service.

How does this XML signature wrapping vulnerability work?

Classified as CWE-347, this flaw involves improper verification of cryptographic signatures. The library performs two separate steps: it checks if the signature is valid and it extracts the user's assertion details. Because these steps happen independently without verifying that the signature specifically protects the extracted data, an attacker can trick the system into trusting a forged identity.

Do I need a stolen password to trigger this bug?

No. The attack does not require stolen credentials or passwords. It requires the attacker to possess any single validly signed SAML message from the system. By prepending a fake, unsigned assertion to that valid message, the library is misled into accepting the forged data as legitimate while it simultaneously confirms the original signature is technically valid.

Is my system at risk if it uses this library?

According to Halo Surface Signal, this risk is highest for internet-facing identity portals, service providers, or web applications. Because these systems must remain reachable to accept incoming authentication assertions from users or third-party identity providers, they are exposed to receiving these crafted, malicious SAML messages directly over the network.

What should I do if my application uses this library?

Begin by auditing your dependency tree to confirm if your project includes the affected versions of the library. Once identified, work with your engineering or identity team to determine if the application processes external SAML assertions. Coordinate a plan to restrict access or update the library, and monitor official developer channels for a secure version release.

References